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It has been held that the right of silence is implicit in the right to a fair trial 
expressed in the European Convention on Human Rights. John Breslin 
reviews Irish authority to see how the privilege against self-incrimination 
operates within a constitutional framework; of particular interest should the 
UK pass a Bill of Rights.
The extent of the freedoms embodied in the right to silence is difficult to define precisely (Thomas, 'The So-Called Right to Silence' (1990-91) 14 New Zealand 
Universities Law Review, 299; Breslin, 'Self-incrimination: Recent 
Developments' (1996) 4 Journal of Financial Crime 47). This is 
partly because the right is founded on judge-made law alone and 
has never been comprehensively codified. Even in jurisdictions 
where fundamental rights and freedoms have been committed to 
writing in the form of a Constitution or Bill of Rights, the right 
to silence or privilege against self-incrimination has not 
necessarily been expressly guaranteed. The Irish Constitution of 
1937 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
are examples. Although the right is not expressly guaranteed by 
the ECHR, it has been held that it is implicit in the express right 
to a fair trial guaranteed by art. 6 of the ECHR (Sounders v UK 
(1997) 23 ECHRR313).
The law on the right to silence is, of course, highly emotive 
and has become complex, making it ever more difficult to 
identify the true basis for the exercise of the right and to identify 
when its boundaries have been transgressed in a given case. For 
example: is the privilege available to a company? The High Court 
of Australia has held, in the context of an investigation into 
alleged environmental pollution, that the right may only be 
claimed by individuals, not companies (Environmental Protection 
Authority v Caltex Refining Co Ply Ltd (1992-93) 178 CER 477). 
The English courts have held, in a similar context, that the righto ' o
has no role in preventing the regulatory authorities gaining 
access to relevant documentation (Re Green Environmental 
Industries Ltd, The Times, 9 October 1997).
In the October 1997 issue of Amicus Curiae (Issue 2, p. 21) 
Victor Tunkel comprehensively reviewed the impact of the 
Sounders decision on English criminal practice. The purpose of 
this article is to refer to Irish authority to see how the privilege
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against self-incrimination operates within a constitutional 
framework. This may be of interest if a Bill of Rights is passed in 
the UK. Secondly, it will be submitted that the Sounders decision 
is fundamentally flawed and should not be followed, either at the 
level of the European Court of Human Rights, or at domestic 
level, should the UK and Ireland incorporate the ECHR into 
their respective domestic laws.
RECENT IRISH CASE LAW
The Irish Supreme Court handed down a fundamentally 
important decision on the constitutional basis of the right to 
silence in Heaney v Ireland [1997] 1 ILRM 117. The defendants 
in that case were convicted under a section in the Offences Against 
the State Act 1939 which required a suspect held in custody to 
give to a police officer an account of his movements. Failure to 
give such an account, or giving a false or misleading account, is a 
criminal offence under the section. The defendants challenged 
the constitutionality of the section under a number of headings, 
including that the provision infringed the defendants' right to 
silence.
The Supreme Court analysed the exercise of the right to 
silence in the context of the right to freedom of expression 
guaranteed by art. 40 of the Constitution. O'Flaherty J (giving 
the judgment of the court) held that the right to silence is 'but a 
corollary of the right of freedom of expression. A series of 
decisions made it clear that it is permissible for the legislature to 
abrogate and qualify7 the exercise of the right of freedom of 
expression, to protect other legitimate interests of the state. In 
particular, O'Flaherty held that:
' the State is entitled to encroach on the right oj the citizen to 
remain silent in pursuit of its entitlement to maintain public peace and 
order.' (at p. 127)
The state must encroach on the rights of the citizen as little as 
possible, but:
'the innocent person has nothing tofearfrom giving an account of 
his or her movements, even though on grounds ojprinciple, or in the 
assertion of constitutional rights, such a person may wish to take a 
stand. However, the court holds that the prima facie entitlement of 
citizens to take such a stand must yield to the right oj the State to 
protect itself. A fortiori, the entitlement of those with something relevant 
to disclose concerning the commission of a crime to remain mute must 
be regarded as of a lesser order. ' (at p. 127 8)
The implications of this approach were illustrated in two 
subsequent cases concerning Ireland's recent legislation 
designed to combat drug-trafficking and organised crime, the
Proceeds of Crime Act 1996.
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The first is M v D (unreported), High Court, 10 December 
1996, Moriarty J. Under the 1996 Act, the police are given the 
power to apply to the court for an order freezing the assets of any 
person suspected of the commission of serious crime, including 
drug-trafficking. Furthermore, the police can apply for an order 
directing the suspect to specify, on affidavit, details of all 
property' in his possession or control, together with his income 
and sources of income, during the ten years prior to the 
application. Moriarty J was sceptical of arguments such as 'the 
innocent have nothing to fear'. Furthermore, he declined to 
follow Leggatt J's view (Re Thomas (Disclosure Order) [1992] 4 All 
ER 814), that disclosure of assets did not amount to self- 
incrimination, but merely facilitated an assessment of the 
amount to be recovered from a defendant who benefited from 
drug-trafficking. Nonetheless, on the basis of the Heaney 
decision, Moriarty J took the view that the 1996 Act represented 
a justifiable and proportionate interference with the 
respondent's right to silence (although he reduced the period in 
respect of which the respondent was to account for his property 
and income from ten to six years). In this regard his Lordship 
further held that any retrospective effect of the Act was fully 
justified.
His Lordship indicated that he expected that the furnishing of 
information under the Act should be subject to an undertaking 
by the prosecution not to use the information in any subsequent 
criminal trial. Mr Tunkel points out that this appears to be the 
state of affairs in which investigators find themselves as a result 
of the Saunders decision (see below). The Supreme Court has not 
yet commented on this judicial restriction on the powers of the 
prosecutors; it would, on any practical analysis, appear to 
emasculate the effectiveness of the powers under the 1996 Act. 
It is submitted that to permit compulsory questioning so as to 
provide 'leads', but not evidence which can be used at trial, 
makes no sense in principle. By forcing the defendant to provide 
the information one is thereby exposing him to the prospect of 
self-incrimination. If the information turns out to be false, the 
defendant can be prosecuted (see the judgment of Walsh J in 
Saunders: the privilege, if it is to be afforded, must logically 
extend to all information which furnishes a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to secure a conviction).
Furthermore restricting the use to which the information can 
be put is open to criticism on practical, as well as theoretical, 
grounds. It merely promotes a 'cat and mouse' game where the 
prosecutor, having been given clues (which may or may not be 
accurate), must follow them up on the off-chance that the clues 
will not lead up a blind alley, and will lead him to stumble upon 
evidence which is otherwise admissible. It also exacerbates the 
risk that the defendant will supply false information, in the 
knowledge that it cannot be tested under cross-examination or 
used to undermine the defendant's credibility1.
GILLIGAN
The effect of the Heaney judgment was further considered in 
Gilliaan v The Criminal Assets Bureau (unreported), High Court, 26 
June f997, McGuinness J. The plaintiff's assets were frozen 
pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996: he challenged the 
constitutionality of the Act on a number of grounds including 
that the obligation to state his sources of income failed to protect 
his privilege against self-incrimination and failed to uphold the! 
presumption of innocence in criminal cases. He also argued that 
the provision breached art. 6 of the ECHR which guaranteed his 
right to a fair trial.o
McGuinness J pointed out that the ECHR does not form part 
of the domestic law of the state (Re O'Laiahleis [1960] IR 93; 
Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36). Furthermore because the 
remedies under the 1996 Act were civil, not criminal in nature, 
she rejected the contention that the effect of the Act was to 
reverse the burden of proof. The legislature in the context of civil 
forfeiture proceedings was entitled to apportion the burden as it 
saw fit, free from any constitutional strictures. In any event, the 
disclosure of assets and their source did not detract from the 
state's obligation, in any ensuing criminal prosecution, to prove 
its case beyond reasonable doubt. Like Moriarty J, however, 
McGuinness J was sceptical of 'the innocent have nothing to 
fear' argument as to the right to silence. However being bound 
by the Heaney decision, she held that the infringement on the 
plaintiff's right to silence was not absolute and could yield to 
other policy considerations.
Her Lordship followed M v D and indicated that in ordering.1 o
the plaintiff to give evidence under s. 9 of the Act, the court 
might require an undertaking from prosecuting authorities not 
to profit directly from the information in any subsequent 
prosecution. She recognised that it might not be possible to 
enforce such an undertaking completely.
THE DECISION IN SAUNDERS
As is well known, the European Court of Human Rights ('the 
court') held that the conviction of Mr Ernegt Saunders in the 
context of the Guinness takeover was unfair because statements 
made by him, under compulsion, to Companies Act inspectors 
were used in his subsequent trial ((1997) 23 ECHRR 3 13). This 
was so even though the trial judge excluded statements so made 
by him after being charged, and even though the defendant
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chose to go into the witness box, thereby putting himself in the 
position of being confronted with the statements in 
cross - examination.
The majority judgment is not altogether free from difficulty. 
The court made some extremely far-reaching statements. ItJ o
concluded that even if the statement made under compulsion 
did not actually incriminate the defendant, it would still be 
excluded under the privilege if it were used during the trial, e.g. 
to attempt to undermine his credibility (at p. 338 9). Thus the 
court adopted an extremely broad definition of what an 
incriminating statement is. The court refused to undertake any 
evaluation of the public interest in the prevention of crime of a 
particular kind. So the court ducked the legitimate and, it is 
submitted, necessary process of evaluating the status of the right 
in comparison with other social interests. This was so even in the 
light of the court's earlier decision in Murray (1996) 22 ECHRR 
29, to the effect that the right is not an absolute one. 
Furthermore, the court indicated that it would only take into 
account local law safeguards if they operated to exclude the 
evidence. The effect of this remarkable stance is, of course, that 
in-built protections, such as those available under statute or the 
trial judge's inherent jurisdiction, will never be taken into 
account.
There are, furthermore, some intellectual weaknesses in the 
majority reasoning in Saunders. The majority hinted that the 
concerns which led it to rule the references to the pre-trial 
interrogation unfair, would not apply to situations where the 
evidence obtained had an existence 'independent' of the will of 
the defendant (at p. 337 8). The court cited examples of 
documents seized from the defendant, DNA samples taken from
bodily tissue, and urine samples. But if such items are taken from 
the defendant under compulsion, what difference in principle 
can it make that these items are of a physical nature and do not 
comprise statements which the defendant has made? The court 
provided no clue and, indeed, one is hard to divine. It is surely 
the existence of the element of compulsion which founds the 
privilege, not the nature of the evidence.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the court's reasoning 
was its emphasis, on the one hand, of the role of the statements 
in securing the defendant's conviction (at p. 320 1 and 339), 
whilst stating later in the judgment that the court could not be 
sure that there would have been no conviction had the 
statements not been used (at p. 342).
CONCLUSIONS
The Saunders decision is troubling, not only for those involved 
in the prosecution of serious financial crime, but also for advisers 
of defendants who may have a legitimate claim that the right has 
been breached in circumstances where a remedy should be 
afforded. The decision foments uncertainty and displays the 
fundamental divisions among judges from various jurisdictions 
on the nature, extent and applicability of the right. The right 
hovers in a constitutional limbo, with no foundation and few 
definite criteria as to when it can successfully be invoked. 
Complications arise in identifying the status of the privilege 
when one considers the argument, summarised by Lord 
Bingham, that the convention is part of EU law in so far as 
specifically recognised by the Court of Justice (Lord Bingham 
The European Convention on Human Rights: Time to Incorporate 
(1993) 109 LQR 390, at p. 400). As such, national courts are 
required to recognise and give effect to the convention in the 
area of community law. The impact of this principle of 
incorporation through the 'back door', in the area of domestic 
enforcement of the criminal law, is perhaps unclear at present.
Individual states should decide
Requiring cases on the right to silence under the convention 
to be handled (at first instance) on a supranational level is to expect 
extraordinary feats of the judges of the court. The right to 
silence is so intimately connected with the signatory state's 
enforcement of criminal policies that it must be left to those
states alone (and their own appellate courts) to decide primarily 
on the rights of citizens in this context. It is too much to expect 
a judge from one jurisdiction to be so familiar with other 
signatory states' policy concerns as to give a coherent evaluation 
of an alleged violation (see Lord Bingham). To date the court has 
not attached sufficient weight to the interests of subsidiarity, i.e. 
the ability of a signatory state to deal with a local problem in the 
manner it sees fit   the decentralisation of power in the 
European Union. The same might be said about other 
contentious rights,   the right to privacy. Until the convention is 
incorporated into domestic law (both British and Irish) it is 
perhaps unreasonable to expect that conditions will exist 
whereby the court will begin to trust local legislatures and courts 
in a more meaningful way.
The right will find its way into English domestic law in some 
form in the context of the proposed Bill of Rights. (This course 
of action is not yet proposed in Ireland, to the best of the 
author's knowledge. Certain fundamental human rights are 
already guaranteed by the Irish Constitution: the task of 
marrying the Irish Constitution with the European Convention 
will be formidable, if it were ever attempted.) A very real tension 
will emerge between traditional English jurisprudence on the 
topic, which tends to be more permissive of interference with 
the right (see, for example, Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd 
v Maxwell [1992] BCLC 475; see also the recent ruling by the 
Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State Jor Trade and Industry, ex p 
McCormick, The Times, 10 February 1998) and the views of the 
Commission (which, as noted, tend to be less permissive) and 
the views of the court (whose collective view is almost impossible 
to fathom and predict). In the meantime, one can only hope that 
the court will soon have the opportunity to pronounce more 
definitively than it did in Saunders on this important topic. It is 
submitted that, like other areas of European law, subsidiarity 
should apply, thereby leaving member states to decide which 
public interest should prevail: the right to silence or the public 
interest in the detection and prosecution of serious crime. @
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